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and investigate your claim.THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHOICE OF TEST FOR FINDING EVIDENCE
OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BY
CATHERINE DONNELLY,M ARTIN ENGLUND AND JENS PERCH NIELSEN
ABSTRACT
We put one of the predictions of adverse-selection models to the test, using data
from the Danish automobile insurance market: that there is a positive corre-
lation between claims risk and insurance coverage. We can find a statistically
significant insurance coverage–risk correlation when coverage is expressed rela-
tive to the insurance premium, but not when it is expressed in monetary terms.
KEYWORDS
Adverse selection, moral hazard, automobile insurance, learning, bivariate pro-
bit.
1. INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric information is present almost everywhere in insurance. Policyhold-
ers are privy to information about themselves, which affects their risk of mak-
ing a claim to the insurer. For example, automobile drivers may know if they
are aggressive or calm while driving. The insurer may believe that such latent
information is correlated with the accident risk of the driver, but is unlikely to
be able to observe it. If the accident risk of the driver is not perfectly observable,
the insurer is at an informational disadvantage to the driver, which means that
asymmetric information is present.
We test for existence of asymmetric information by examining the relation-
ship between the policyholder’s claims risk and level of insurance coverage, us-
ing data from the Danish automobile insurance market. If either an individual
withahighclaimsriskchoosesmoreinsurancecoverageorthemerefactofhav-
ing insurance coverage modifies the claims risk of an individual, then we might
expect to find a positive correlation between the policyholder’s claims risk and
level of insurance coverage (Chiappori and Salani´ e, 2000).
We find that the choice of statistical test is critical when analysing the corre-
lation between risk and the insurance coverage bought by the policyholder. For
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example, we can find a statistically significant risk–coverage correlation when
coverage is expressed relative to the insurance premium, but not when it is ex-
pressed in monetary terms. Our conclusion is that the results are not robust:
they depend on the test chosen for the analysis.
The two special cases of asymmetric information that may cause the positive
correlation property are adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection
refers to a market process in which poor products or customers are more likely
to be selected, due to asymmetric information. The asymmetry can be caused
by private information of one of the parties. It can be due to regulations or
social norms that prevent the insurer from using certain characteristics to set
the premiums. Two ways to model adverse selection are with signalling games
and screening games; see Spence (1973).
Moral hazard means that the policyholder may have some degree of control
over the probability and size of the occurrence of an insured event, due to the
care taken. Care can be interpreted not only as money, but also as diligence,
mental concentration or intensity of effort; see Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
Under adverse selection without moral hazard, the degree of insurance cov-
erage chosen by the policyholder is based on the ex ante assessment that a poli-
cyholder makes of their likelihood of having an accident. Neither the frequency
nor the claim size are functions of the actions of the policyholder since moral
hazard does not exist.
In the presence of moral hazard, the amount of insurance coverage affects
the efforts of the policyholder to prevent accidents. The probability of an acci-
dent can be seen as a function of the level of care taken, which is unobservable
by the insurer. Generous coverage reduces the expected cost of an accident for
thepolicyholderandthereforetheincentivesforsafety.Morecoveragemaylead
to more accidents.
Moral hazard can be subdivided into two types. Ex ante moral hazard oc-
curs before an accident. It concerns the impact of the policyholder’s actions
on the probability of occurrence and severity upon occurrence of the insured
event. For example, the policyholder would demonstrate ex ante moral hazard
if they smoked in bed only after the purchase of fire insurance. Ex post moral
hazard occurs during or after an accident, and affects the severity of the claim.
For example, the policyholder would demonstrate ex post moral hazard if they
did not pick up their wallet as they escaped from their burning house, which
they would have done if they had not been covered by the fire insurance policy.
Similarly, by claiming on their fire insurance policy for a personal possession
destroyed by the fire, for an item that the policyholder would not have replaced
if they were not covered by insurance, the policyholder also demonstrates ex
post moral hazard. See Chiappori and Salani´ e (2013) for a further discussion of
the distinction between these two types of moral hazard.
Each of moral hazard and adverse selection predict that, conditional on
the underwriting variables used for pricing the insurance policy, there should
be a positive correlation between risk and coverage both within a risk class
across consecutive time periods and within a single time period. An empiricallyASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 3
observed positive correlation may be due to the omission of some information
in the analysis. For example, a risk characteristic of the policyholder that is
not used by the insurer in pricing may lead to a spurious positive correlation
(Chiappori and Salani´ e, 2013). Nevertheless, conditional on the underwriting
variables used for pricing the insurance policy, the correlation between coverage
and risk should be a good test for asymmetric information since policyholders
who choose different levels of insurance coverage should be different in either
their risk aversion or their risk preferences (or both).
While evidence of a coverage–risk correlation is found in studies of some
insurance markets,1 the findings have been rather diverse in the automobile
insurance market. Three initial studies, Dahlby (1983, 1992); Puelz and Snow
(1994), suggest the existence of a coverage–risk correlation. Their findings were
challenged by the research of Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) and Dionne et al.
(2001). Chiappori and Salani´ e use more refined methods and cannot reject a
zero correlation between higher insurance coverage and more accidents in their
French data.2 Nor can Dionne et al. find evidence for asymmetric information
using data from Quebec, and the same goes for Saito (2006) on the Japanese
automobile insurance market. Cohen (2005) finds a positive coverage–risk cor-
relation in the Israeli automobile insurance market.
These scattered conclusions might be due to a number of reasons. For exam-
ple, there may be differences in the specific data sets, the definition of claim, the
statistical tests chosen or the market structures. For instance, Kim et al. (2009)
find evidence of asymmetric information in the automobile insurance market of
Korea, using a multinomial measurement but not with the more traditional di-
chotomous measurement. There is also empirical evidence that risk-averse pol-
icyholders tend to buy more coverage and yet be more cautious, hence they are
less risky; see de Meza and Webb (2001). Sonnenholzner and Wambach (2009)
findthat patientpolicyholdersuse higheffort toavoida lossandbuyhighinsur-
ance coverage, whereas the impatient ones do not. This may counter the effects
of adverse selection.
We test if the scattered conclusions might be due to the choice of statistical
test. The tests used in the literature define high coverage as high relative either
to the insurance premium (Cohen, 2005) or to a chosen monetary level (Dionne
et al., 2001; Saito, 2006), or use a definition that does not make such distinc-
tions (for example, Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) define coverage as high if it is
complete — i.e. comprehensive — insurance coverage rather than partial insur-
ance3). We apply both possible definitions of relative high coverage, in separate
tests and on the same data. We use a rich data set from the Danish automobile
insurance market. We have access to all data available to the insurer who sup-
pliedthedata.Thisisimportantsincewecanusethesamepricingschemeasthe
insurer, and avoid spurious effects due to under- or over-parameterisation. We
focus on the coverage of property damages (called collision coverage in some
countries) since it is the only coverage of the automobile insurance product for
which the policyholder chooses the level of deductible. The lower the deductible
chosen by the policyholder, the higher the amount of coverage, and vice versa.4 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
Intheabsenceofanyinformationonpolicyholders’riskaversion,weassume
thattheyhavethesamelevelofriskaversion.Theneachpolicyholderisfullyde-
scribed by a single number, for example their individual probability of accident.
It follows that the policyholders who have a high propensity of experiencing
accidents will choose a higher coverage than those with a low propensity. Note
that the policyholder’s level of risk aversion can cause the opposite effect.
We find that for fixed-price product policyholders, the results are not robust
tothechoiceoftest.Itmattershowtheinsurancecoverageisexpressed,whether
relative to the premium paid or in absolute monetary terms. It matters at what
level the coverage is deemed to be high. For the same data subset, a statistically
significant positive correlation is found only when a high coverage is defined
as the policyholder’s chosen deductible equalling three times their premium or
more. Our findings are consistent with the previous literature, and may account
for some of the disparities between them. However, we do not have an explana-
tion for why it should matter how the insurance coverage is expressed. This is
very interesting, and it requires further investigation.
Analogous to the study of Cohen (2005), we also investigate the policyhold-
ers who are new to the insurer. New policyholders are more likely to have an
advantage in terms of the amount of information over the insurer. It may also
be the case that an insurer is better able to evaluate the information that they
havecollectedonrepeatpolicyholdersthanthepolicyholdersthemselves.Weare
able to find a statistically significant positive correlation between risk and the
level of coverage for new policyholders who have bought a fixed-price product.
The paper is arranged as follows: in Section 2, we present the economic
model of asymmetric information and motivate the tests for asymmetric in-
formation. In Section 3, we describe the data and the products offered by the
insurer. The results are presented and discussed in Section 4. We conclude in
Section 5.
2. ARE TESTS FOR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ROBUST?
We consider a market in which the insurer makes an exclusive contract with the
policyholder. For example, a policyholder can not have more than one automo-
bile insurance policy for each car, due to possible moral hazard. It allows insur-
ers to implement non-linear and, in particular, convex pricing schemes, which
are typically needed under asymmetric information; see Chiappori (2000) and
Frees et al. (2009).
The policies offered by the insurer, as for all policies offered in the Danish
automobile market, are one-period policies with no commitment on the part
of either the insurer or the policyholder. This means that a policyholder can
switch to another insurance company in the next period if they wish. In the
Danish market, insurers do not share information about their policyholders
with other insurers. Despite the inability to commit, both parties can sign aASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 5
first-periodcontractthatshouldbefollowedbyasecond-periodcontract,which
is experience-rated. This is described in more detail later on.
We investigate property damages insurance coverage only, which means that
the claim frequency is lower than if we looked at all claim types. We test for
statistical evidence of
• policyholders with a higher claim frequency choosing high coverage, without
checking whether it is due to adverse selection or moral hazard,
• moral hazard, and
• policyholder learning.
Mostoftheusualassumptionsusedinmodelsonadverseselectionaremain-
tained in this paper: a policyholder’s information is costly to observe by the
insurer, the provision of the insurance is costless and the insurer is risk-neutral
while the policyholders are risk-averse, having identical twice-differentiable, in-
creasing and strictly concave utility functions. However, we relax the usual as-
sumption that neither the frequency nor the claim size are functions of the ac-
tions of the policyholder, since a correlation between coverage and accidents
is consistent not only with the existence of adverse selection but also with the
existence of moral hazard.4
As discussed in Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000), it is generally a delicate task
to model the claim frequency, since omission of some variables can generate
spuriouscorrelations.Weusethesamecovariatesandmodelsastheinsureruses
for the pricing scheme of this particular automobile insurance coverage. Hence,
we ought not to experience the same problems of spurious effects and therefore
our results should be considered rather reliable.
2.1. Testing if risky policyholders choose more coverage
Theliteratureonadverseselectioninacompetitivesettingbuildsontheinfluen-
tial paper Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). One of the predictions of their model,
highlighted by Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000), is that contracts with higher in-
surance coverage are chosen by policyholders who have, for example, a higher
expected probability of accident (or claim frequency). Moreover, these choices
should be fairly robust under adverse selection. Chiappori and Salani´ e suggest
that the veracity of the prediction can be checked using a fairly simple test: if it
is true then a positive correlation between claim frequency and coverage should
be seen on observationally identical policyholders, conditional on the variables
used for pricing.
We begin by testing the conditional independence of the occurrence of acci-
dents (in this case, reported claims) and the choice of coverage. The hypothesis
of zero correlation is tested in a bivariate probit model, motivated by the rec-
ommendation of Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000).5
We consider two distinct definitions of high coverage in the tests. In one def-
inition, the amount of coverage chosen by the policyholder is deemed “high”
if the deductible is below a fixed monetary threshold. In the other, the amount6 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
of coverage chosen by the policyholder is deemed “high” if the ratio of the de-
ductible to the premium is below a fixed threshold. We wish to see if the results
are different under the two different definitions. If so, it may account at least
partially for the discrepancies in the results in the literature.
However, the simplicity of testing the prediction of Chiappori and Salani´ e
has a cost. By itself, the coverage–risk correlation does not allow the identifi-
cation of the type of informational asymmetry involved, if any exists. One can
argue that the origin of a claim does not really matter for the pricing process, as
long as the insurer cannot observe the underlying characteristics. The insurer is
liable for a claim regardless of whether it is due to an endogenous risk or lack
of care. However, if the insurer is interested in dealing with and reducing the in-
formational asymmetry then it is important to know the difference. Moreover,
theoretically this will affect our assumptions and conclusions: a Rothschild-
Stiglitz equilibrium exists if and only if there are enough high-risk agents in
the economy, under the assumption of adverse selection only. When both ad-
verse selection and moral hazard are present, this condition is no longer true.
An equilibrium may, or may fail to, exist whatever the proportion of agents of
different types, depending on the parameters or the model; see Chassagnon and
Chiappori (1997).
2.2. Testing for moral hazard
Although we are primarily interested in this paper about the consequence of
using a particular definition of high coverage, we also test for moral hazard.
Many tests to distinguish whether asymmetric information depends on moral
hazardoradverseselectionhavebeenproposedintheliterature.6 Unfortunately,
thesetestsarenotapplicableforthedatasetavailabletousastheyarespecificto
the data or market structure under investigation. A more sophisticated dynamic
model is employed by Abbring et al. (2008). They assume that policyholders
seektomaximisetheexpectationofadiscountedpowerutilityfunction.Related
works are those of Dionne et al. (2011) and Dionne et al. (2013).
We assume that for the experience-rated insurance contracts, and allowing
for moral hazard, a policyholder has an incentive to be more cautious after
experiencing a claim in one year. The incentive is that, if no claims are reported,
the premium for the next policy year decreases. Consequently, if moral hazard
is present, the existence of moral hazard would suggest that there is a negative
correlation between claims in one year and the following year, conditional on
some explanatory variables.
Thus we assume that the Danish policyholders make insurance decisions by
considering only the near future, rather than their entire future lifetime.7 Our
assumption is consistent with how the insurance company prices its policies.
To see if there is evidence of moral hazard, we test the hypothesis of zero
correlation between whether a claim was made or not in the year 2007, and
whether a claim was made or not in the year 2008. We do the test not only on
experience-ratedpolicyholders,butalsoonthosewhobuyafixed-priceproduct.ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 7
It may seem surprising to test the fixed-price policyholders, as the hypothesis on
moral hazard does not hold for these types of insurance products. However, if
thecorrelationbetweenclaimsinconsecutiveyearsispositive,thisphenomenon
is called claims migration and it is interesting for fixed-priced products.8
2.3. Testing for policyholder learning
One can argue that a completely new policyholder and the insurer are equally
uninformed regarding the policyholder’s risk, as the former lacks experience
of driving and of the insurance market, and the latter lacks experience of the
former. This is called symmetric incomplete information; see De Garidel-Thoron
(2000). In such case, it would be inefficient to draw conclusions based on the ex
ante selection of contracts from the offered menu of contracts.
However, as time goes by, both the insurer and the policyholder gain more
experience, which is referred to as learning. The learning may not necessarily
occur equally for the two parties, which can lead to ex post adverse selection.
Furthermore, if the policyholder then changes insurer we can assume that the
information asymmetry truly exists.9 If moral hazard is not present and a claim
is followed by the policyholder decreasing their coverage, ceteris paribus, this
indicates that the policyholder has become more aware of their own risk by
learning.
To see if there is evidence of policyholder learning, we test the hypothesis of
zero correlation between whether a claim was made or not in the year 2007, and
whetherthepolicyholderdecreasedtheircoverageornotfromyear2007toyear
2008. Again, this is done conditional on the variables observed by the insurer,
and using a bivariate probit model. We repeat the test but looking at whether
the policyholder increased their coverage or not from year 2007 to year 2008.
Unfortunately, the tests are somewhat weak since a driver may also learn from
unreported “near misses”, when an accident almost happens but fortunately
does not occur.
3. DATA, PRODUCTS AND THE GLM MODEL
3.1. Data
The data set used is from one of the three largest Danish insurance companies
and covers all data available for the insurer on personal lines automobile insur-
ance, i.e. cars for personal usage at a maximum weight of 3.5 tonnes, from 2002
to 2008. The data set is specific for this insurer, but the information included is
typical for most insurers. Thus we consider the results obtained as general, at
least for the Danish automobile insurance market.
For each policyholder, the insurer has documented around 80 covariates.
For instance, they are the policyholder’s demographic characteristics such as8 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
age and gender for both the policyholder and the principal driver, and their
residential area; the characteristics of the insured car: brand, size of engine, fuel
type,modelyear;theperiodcovered:thelength(duration)oftheperiodcovered
by the purchased policy.
3.2. Products
Theinsurerofferstwocarproductsforpersonallinesautomobileinsurance:one
fixed-price premium product and one experience-rated premium product, with
a finite number of levels. In Denmark it is mandatory for all car owners to have
a third-party liability insurance. The property damages coverage that we inves-
tigate is voluntary. It covers damages on the vehicle that originate from bodily
injury, collateral damages, theft, robbery, vandalism, fire, explosion, lightning
and thrown objects.
The eligibility criteria for the fixed-price product are the following: the user
has to be at least 25 years of age, and has not reported any claims on the third-
partyliabilitycoverageduringthelastfiveyearsandhasnotreportedanyclaims
duringthelastthreeyearsonthepropertydamagescoverage,thoughthreeglass
damageclaimsareaccepted.Thesecriteriaarespecifictothisinsurer,butsimilar
products are offered by most Danish insurers.
Almost anyone can purchase the experience-rated product. The level that a
policyholder starts on depends on age and number of years without claims. To
getthelowestpremiuminthisproduct,thepolicyholdermustfulfilthefollowing
criteria: at least eight years of claim-free driving, of which the last three must be
totally claim-free, though glass damage claims are accepted. Note that there is
no legal regulation of the rating scheme on the Danish insurance market, as in
the French or Canadian ones.10
Thepolicyholdersarefurthermoresub-dividedinto“new”and“repeat”pol-
icyholders, since we think it is more likely to find adverse selection in the group
of new policyholders than in the group of existing policyholders. The “new“
group are the new policyholders who have an automobile insurance policy with
a seniority of less than one year. The repeated policyholders have held an auto-
mobile insurance policy for at least one year with the present insurer (though
not necessarily on the same car).
Both types of policyholders choose their level of deductible. A higher level
of deductible means that the policyholder has a lower insurance coverage, and
vice versa. There are many levels of deductibles in Denmark compared to other
markets. In 1990, the levels of deductible given in Danish kroner (DKK) were
set at 500, 1,000, 1,500, ...,10,000. Each year the deductibles have been ad-
justed. For example, in 2008 the levels were 919, ...,18,970 in DKK, with an
average level of 4,176 DKK. In comparison, the average premium in 2008 of
a motor insurance policy is 4,901 DKK. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the
deductibles chosen by the policyholders in 2008, discounted to their value in the
year 1990.ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 9
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FIGURE 1: Distribution of deductibles chosen by policyholders in 2008, discounted to their 1990 value and
expressed in thousands of monetary units. Elite denotes the fixed-price policyholders and Step denotes the
experience-rated policyholders.
Policyholderswithregisteredpaymentdefaultaredealtwithbyspecialrules,
and they are omitted in this study.
3.3. GLM estimation and data issues
First we perform the same procedure as in the pricing department of the insurer
to find the covariates to be used when pricing the insurance coverage. The co-
variates for policyholder i = 1,2,...and calendar year j = 2002,...,2008
are represented by the column vector xij. The corresponding exposure weight
(i.e. the duration) ωij is measured in policy years. As is standard in insurance
applications of generalised linear models (GLMs), separate analyses are per-
formed for the claim frequency and the average claim cost. We are interested in
theclaimfrequencyonly,sincewewanttocompareourresultswiththeprevious
literature.
We assume that the expected claim frequency follows a (ωij-weighted) Pois-
son GLM, which means that the expected number of claims νij can be written10 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
TABLE 1
SELECTION OF THE PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR A GLM MODEL FOR THE EXPECTED CLAIM FREQUENCY.
Analysis of Parameter Estimation
Parameter Estimate Std Error χ2 Prob. >χ 2
Class variable 1 Yes −1.8306 0.2419 57.25 <10−4
Class variable 1 No −2.2395 0.2390 87.82 <10−4
Class variable 2 0 −0.2128 0.0363 34.28 <10−4
Class variable 2 1 0.0000 0.0000 – <10−4
Variable 1 (Deductible) −0.0751 0.0061 151.65 <10−4
Variable 2 −0.0589 0.0080 54.42 <10−4
Variable 3 0.0521 0.0082 40.34 <10−4
Variable 4 0.0441 0.0039 125.05 <10−4
Variable 5 −0.0029 0.0008 13.40 0.0003
Variable 6 −0.0336 0.0026 167.00 <10−4
Variable 7 −0.0215 0.0068 10.00 0.0016
Variable 8 0.8624 0.0523 271.73 <10−4
Variable 9 −0.9178 0.0969 89.69 <10−4
Variable 10 0.0350 0.0028 159.41 <10−4
Variable 11 −0.0297 0.0031 94.45 <10−4
Note: There are two class variables and 11 continuous variables. Variable 1 is the level of deductible given in
thousands of DKK and discounted to 1990, denoted by dij. The other variables can be, for example, age of the
driver, age of the insured car and seniority of the policyholder. The actual variables used remain unspecified
due to confidentiality reasons. The estimates are based on information about 182,031 policyholders who held
an active insurance policy from 2002 to 2006.
as
νij = ωijexp(β β β xij),
inwhichβ β β isacolumnvectorofparameterstobeestimated,andβ β β  denotesthe
transpose of β β β. We use the information about 182,031 policyholders who held
an active insurance policy during the years 2002–2006 to estimate β β β.
The results of the GLM estimation for some of the components of β β β are
shown in Table 1. Due to confidentiality reasons, the actual variables used in
the GLM regression are unspecified. Although we find the gender of the prin-
cipal driver significant,11 it is not used in the pricing scheme of the property
damages coverage due to interpretation difficulties. It was therefore excluded in
the forthcoming analysis.
The level of deductible chosen by policyholder i in year j, and discounted
back to their value in the year 1990, is denoted dij. The deductible variable
dij has a corresponding GLM parameter estimate of −0.0751. This means that
policyholders with higher deductibles (i.e. lower coverage) report fewer claims.
Naturally, policyholders with lower deductibles are able to file claims for acci-
dents with damage costs that are too small to claim under policies with a higher
deductible. In insurance data we can only observe claims, not accidents. The
decision to report a claim is usually made by the policyholder, and should beASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 11
considered as either a response to or an outcome of a choice based on incen-
tives. If the expected costs of reporting a claim exceed the expected compensa-
tion then the policyholder can choose not to file the accident. For instance, the
experience-rated policyholder may expect to have a higher future premium as a
result of reporting a claim, or it may be that the expected costs of the claim are
lessthanthedeductible.Hence,ifwecountallclaimsreportedbylow-deductible
policyholdersthenweexpectmoreclaimstobesubmittedbythelow-deductible
policyholders, even if the two groups are identical in their risk type.
One way to deal with the bias, suggested in Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000),
is to omit all accidents in which only one vehicle was involved. An even more
restrictive way is to consider only accidents involving bodily injuries, since it is
mandatory to report these kind of accidents. However, this requires a lot more
detailed level of documentation and processing of data and reduces the number
of accidents radically.
Instead, we only count claims with a severity that exceed the highest level
of deductible, following Cohen (2005). Such claims should be submitted by all
policyholders, regardless of their chosen level of deductible, which means that
we treat all policyholders fairly. After this truncation, the GLM parameter es-
timate of dij is 0.0357 so that policyholders with higher deductibles (i.e. lower
coverage) report more claims. However, the estimate is no longer significant at a
reasonable level, as the corresponding p-value is 0.1249. Thus we have reduced,
if not removed, the spurious correlation between the level of deductible and the
number of claims. Note that this comes at the cost of a lower claims frequency.
Additionally, we separate claims into those in which the insured is at fault
and those in which the insured is not at fault. The reason for this is that, if
another driver is to blame for the accident, the information on the insured’s
risk type may not be conveyed. Furthermore, in addition to removing all claims
with a severity above the highest level of deductible from the data, we do not
use the further information associated to drivers who had several claims during
one year. They are relatively few in number; only 0.082% of all policyholders
had more than one claim in 2008.
4. DATA ANALYSIS
4.1. A bivariate probit model
For each analysis, we use a bivariate probit model.For policyholderi with char-
acteristics drawn from the random vector Xij in year j, the bivariate probit
model for two zero-one indicator random variables Y ij and Zij is
Y ij = 1
 
β β β Xij +  ij > 0
 
, Zij = 1
 
γ γ γ  Xij + ηij > 0
 
,
and  
 ij
ηij
  
     Xij = xij ∼ N
  
0
0
 
,
 
1 ρ
ρ 1
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in which 1{·} is the zero-one indicator function,γ γ γ is a column vector of param-
eters and ρ is the correlation. The latter two parameters are estimated from the
data.
If the correlation ρ equals zero then, by the assumption of normality, it
follows that Y ij and Zij are conditionally independent random variables. The
bivariate probit test, used in Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) and Cohen (2005),
is to test the null hypothesis that the correlation ρ equals zero (see Casella and
Berger 2002 for an introduction to statistical inference).
In all of the tests performed, the random variable Y ij represents the risk of
policyholder i in year j: it denotes whether policyholder i has made a claim or
not in the year j. Define
yij =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
1 if policyholder i had at least one claim in which they are
judged to be at fault in year j,
0o t h e r w i s e
(i.e. either no claim or policyholder i not at fault in year j).
We assume that each yij is a sample from Y ij.
The random variable Zij represents the coverage, with its exact interpreta-
tion depending on the chosen test, as detailed in the sequel.
4.2. Testing for coverage–risk correlation
To ease the interpretation of the results and reduce the risk of spurious effects
due to unforeseen expectations of future changes in premium, we start by fo-
cusing on the fixed-price policyholders. The model was estimated using the in-
formation on 125,437 fixed-price policyholders who held an active insurance
policy in 2008. There are 143,919 observations for all fixed-price policyholders
and 14,550 observations for the new fixed-price policyholders only.
4.2.1. Fixed-price policyholders and monetary threshold. For the first
coverage–risk correlation test on the fixed-price policyholders, we define
zij(T) =
 
1i fdij ≤ T, i.e. policyholder i has chosen high coverage in year j,
0i fdij > T, i.e. policyholder i has chosen low coverage in year j,
in which T is a threshold deductible. We assume that each zij(T) is a sample
from the coverage random variable Zij(T).
The GLM parameter estimate for the variable zij(T) for different choices
of the threshold deductible T are displayed in Table 2 for the fixed-price poli-
cyholders. This gives a preliminary indication of the existence of a relationship
between coverage and risk. We see that it is possible to find a positive and sta-
tistically significant parameter, indicating that the claims are more common for
fixed-price policyholders who choose a high coverage (i.e. a low deductible).
However, the choice of threshold deductible matters. For example, the estimateASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 13
TABLE 2
GLM ESTIMATE OF THE PARAMETER FOR zij(T) FOR FIXED-PRICE POLICYHOLDERS.
Monetary Threshold Deductible T
500 1,500 2,500 3,500 4,500 5,500
Estimate for zij(T) 0.235    0.182    0.0401  0.0215 0.0003 0.1663  
Fixed-price policyholders with
high coverage 0.2% 5.4% 61.3% 94.5% 94.9% 98.9%
Note:    ,    and   indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable zij(T) replaces the
level of deductible dij in the GLM model. All the remaining GLM estimates are the same as in Table 1. The
estimates are based on the same data and time period as in Table 1. The percentage of policyholders who
choose a high coverage (i.e. a deductible less than T) for each group is shown below the estimate for zij.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED COVERAGE-RISK CORRELATION AND TAKE-UP FOR FIXED-PRICE POLICYHOLDERS.
Monetary Threshold Deductible T
500 1,500 2,500 3,500 4,500 5,500
All fixed-price policyholders ρ 0.0027 0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0049 −0.0056 0.0034
All fixed-price policyholders
with high coverage 0.2% 5.4% 61.3% 94.5% 94.9% 98.9%
New fixed-price policyholders ρ 0.0230 0.0036 0.0187 −0.0206 −0.0312   −0.0515   
New fixed-price policyholders
with high coverage 0.3% 18.9% 62.5% 97.3% 98.0% 99.6%
Note:     and    indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Estimated correlation between the risk
variable Y i,2008 and the coverage variable Zi,2008(T) for fixed-price policyholders. The percentage of policyhold-
ers who choose a high coverage (i.e. a deductible less than T) for each group is shown below the correlation
estimate.
is not statistically significant at T = 3,500, but it is at the lower threshold T =
1,500 and also at the higher threshold T = 5,500.
We apply the bivariate probit test with the risk random variable Y i,2008 and
the coverage random variable Zi,2008(T) for each policyholder i. For all the
coverage–risk tests, the entry for the deductible is removed from the covariate
vector xij, and the parameters β β β and γ γ γ are adjusted likewise. The resultant ad-
justed covariate vector ¯ xij(T) and adjusted parameter vectors ¯ β β β and ¯ γ γ γ replace
their counterparts in the probit model.
Table 3 displays the estimated coverage–risk correlation for different values
of the threshold deductible T for all of the fixed-price policyholders and for the
new fixed-price policyholders only.
The correlation estimate for all fixed-price policyholders is sometimes nega-
tive,contradictingthepredictionofthestandardtheoryofasymmetricinforma-
tion. However, none of the estimates are statistically significant at a reasonable
level and may well be the result of spurious effects.14 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
Forthenewfixed-pricepolicyholders,wefindanegativecorrelationforsome
choices of the threshold deductible. This means that policyholders with a high
coverage (i.e. a deductible below the chosen threshold) also have fewer claims.
However, the negative correlation is only statistically significant when the ma-
jority of new fixed-price policyholders have a high coverage. For example, for
the 99.6% of the new fixed-price policyholders who choose a deductible below
5,500 DKK, the estimated correlation of −0.0515 is significant at the 1% level.
This means that the remaining 0.4% of the new fixed-price policyholders, who
choosealowcoverage,arelikelytohavemoreclaims.Thisisnotweexpecttosee,
given the theory of adverse selection and moral hazard. It could be explained
by advantageous selection models, which assume that lower-risk policyholders
are both more cautious and risk averse, and thus choose a lower deductible; see
de Meza and Webb (2001).
In fact, the statistically significant negative correlation is because some
young drivers are forced to have a high level of deductible in order to be allowed
to buy an insurance policy. They are expected to have more claims, which does
seem to be the case. Thus the negative correlation is not a consequence of the
young drivers’ own choices, but rather due to policy restrictions.
In conclusion, when expressing coverage as a monetary amount, we do not
findevidenceofasymmetricinformationineitherthesetofallfixed-pricepolicy-
holders or the subset of new fixed-price policyholders only. There is not enough
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that risk and coverage are conditionally
independent, regardless of the level of deductible at which the policyholders’
coverage is labelled as high.
We continue testing the coverage–risk correlation by investigating what hap-
pens if coverage is expressed relative to the deductible, as is done in Cohen
(2005).
4.2.2. Fixed-price policyholders and relative threshold. For the second
coverage-risk correlation test on the policyholders, we define
zrel
ij (R) =
 
1i fdij/Pij ≤ R, i.e. relatively high coverage,
0i fdij/Pij > R, i.e. relatively low coverage,
in which Pij is the premium charged to policyholder i in year j,a n dR is a
relative threshold deductible. We assume that each zrel
ij (R) is a sample from a
random variable Zrel
ij (R), the relative coverage random variable.
Again,weapplythebivariateprobittestoutlinedinSection4.1,withtherisk
random variable Y i,2008 and the relative coverage random variable Zrel
i,2008(R) for
each policyholder i. Table 4 provides the estimates of the relative coverage–risk
correlation for all and new fixed-price policyholders, respectively.
For the higher relative thresholds, we find a positive correlation at a statis-
tically significant level of 1%. For example, for a relative threshold R = 4, all
fixed-price policyholders have an estimated correlation of 0.0108 and the new
fixed-pricepolicyholdershaveanestimatedcorrelationof0.0352,bothatthe1%ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 15
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED RELATIVE COVERAGE-RISK CORRELATION AND TAKE-UP FOR FIXED-PRICE POLICYHOLDERS.
Relative Threshold Deductible R
123 4 5
All fixed-price policyholders ρ −0.0026 0.0044 0.0064  0.0108    0.0115   
All fixed-price policyholders with
high coverage 19.0% 83.7% 95.4% 97.2% 97.7%
New fixed-price policyholders ρ −0.0113 0.0109 0.0199 0.0352    0.0229 
New fixed-price policyholders with
high coverage 36.1% 76.1% 82.4% 83.2% 83.4%
Note:     and   indicate significance at 1% and 10% level, respectively. Estimated correlation between the risk
variable Y i,2008 and the relative coverage variable Zrel
i,2008(R) for fixed-price policyholders. The percentage of
policyholders who choose a high relative coverage for each group is shown below the correlation estimate.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED COVERAGE-RISK AND RELATIVE COVERAGE-RISK CORRELATION FOR EXPERIENCE-RATED
POLICYHOLDERS.
Threshold Type
Monetary Units Relative to Premium
T = 4,000 R = 4.5
New experience-rated policyholders ρ 0.0120 −0.0240
Repeat experience-rated policyholders ρ 0.0029 0.0067
Note: None of the correlation estimates are significant. Estimated correlation between the risk vari-
able Y i,2008 and either the coverage variable Zi,2008(T) o rt h er e l a t i v ec o v e r a g ev a r i a b l eZrel
i,2008(R),f o r
experience-rated policyholders.
level. Thus there is evidence to reject the hypothesis that risk and (relative) cov-
erage are conditionally independent. The omission of the gender variable does
not explain the asymmetry, since we found the correlation to be still statistically
significant when the gender variable is added to the model.
In conclusion, when using the notion of relative coverage, we find evidence
of asymmetric information for both all and new fixed-price policyholders.
4.2.3. Experience-rated policyholders. Finally, we run both types of coverage–
risk correlation tests on the experience-rated policyholders. The estimation is
based on data from the year 2008. There are 3,861 observations for the new
experience-rateddriversand53,200observationsfortherepeatexperience-rated
policyholders. A selection of the results is shown in Table 5.
For the policyholders with an experience-rated insurance product, we are
unabletofindanycorrelationthatisstatisticallysignificantatareasonablelevel.
Thus there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that risk and
coverage are conditionally independent for the experience-rated policyholders.16 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
4.2.4. Discussion of coverage-risk correlation results. When we express the de-
ductible relative to the paid premium, we can find a positive coverage–risk cor-
relation for both new and repeat fixed-price policyholders at the 1% significance
level(seeTable4).AccordingtoRothschildandStiglitz(1976),foradverseselec-
tion to exist neither insurers nor their customers have to be perfectly informed
about the differences in risk properties that exist among individuals. Our results
suggest that the fixed-price policyholders who choose a low coverage (i.e. high
deductible) are aware of their risk.
When a coverage–risk correlation is found for the fixed-price policyholders,
the population is split so that most policyholders have a high coverage (i.e. a
low deductible): at a relative threshold deductible of 4, about 83% of the new
fixed-pricepolicyholdersand97%ofallfixed-pricepolicyholdershavehighcov-
erage. Our finding is consistent with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), which says
that,underadverseselection,anequilibriumexistsonlyifthereareenoughhigh
risks. The test identifies the few “good” (i.e. low risk, low relative coverage) pol-
icyholders, who could then be offered additional products by the insurer as in
Donnellyet al. (2013). However,the insurer wouldnot have foundany such pol-
icyholders if they had attempted to identify them using the threshold deductible
expressed in monetary terms.
A positive coverage–risk correlation for a fixed-priced product is also found
by Cohen (2005) when looking at drivers with three or more years of driving
experience.Eventhoughwelackdirectinformationonthenumberofyearswith
driving licence, it is implicit that fixed-price policyholders have held a licence for
threeyearsormore:tobeabletopurchasetheproduct,theymustbeclaims-free
foratleastthreeyears.Moreover,theanalysisinCohenisanalogoustoourrisk-
relativecoveragetest,inthatthedeductiblesareexpressedintermsofpremiums
paid. However, there are differences between the menu of deductibles offered to
the Danish drivers of our study and the Israeli drivers of Cohen’s study.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the deductible in relation to the paid pre-
mium for each policyholder group in our Danish data. The appearances of the
histograms are rather smooth except for the spikes in the tail where the de-
ductibleisapproximatelyfourtimesthepaidpremium.Thedeductiblesaregen-
erally of the same size as the premium. This is quite different from the Israeli
market described in Cohen (2005), in which there are only four levels of de-
ductible offered to policyholders and each deductible has a premium associated
with it. The low deductible is set at approximately 30% of the regular premium,
the regular deductible at 50%, a high deductible is considered to be 90% and
a very high deductible is around 130% of the regular premium. In the context
of our Danish data set, almost all the chosen deductibles of the policyholders
are to be considered high or very high, according to Cohen’s gradation. Indeed,
the threshold deductible of 4 at which we find a positive risk-relative coverage
correlation at a statistically significant level corresponds roughly to an Israeli
policyholder choosing a “very high” deductible. In Cohen’s data, less than 2%
of policyholders choose a high or very high deductible, and she excluded them
fromheranalysis.TheframingofthedeductiblemenutopolicyholdersmayalsoASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 17
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FIGURE 2: Distribution of the ratio of the deductibles to the paid premium in 2008. Elite denotes the
fixed-price policyholders and Step denotes the experience-rated policyholders.
affect their choice: the deductibles are described to the Israeli policyholders as
low, regular, high or very high, expressed relative to the premium paid, whereas
theDanishpolicyholdersareofferedamenuof20deductiblesexpressedinmon-
etary terms, without reference to the premium paid. However, it is difficult to
see how our results could be adjusted to allow a direct comparison with those
of Cohen (2005).
We do not find any evidence of a coverage–risk correlation for the
experience-rated policyholders. Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) finds the same
result for an experience-rated French automobile product. Our results suggest
that the pricing structure of the experience-rated product is sufficiently good
to remove the effects of any possible asymmetric information. Alternatively,
it might be explained that, at 3,861, the number of observations for the new
experience-rated policyholders are too few. However, the same explanation
looks weak when applied to the repeat experience-rated policyholders, as there
are 53,200 observations for them. A third explanation is that we have not
taken into consideration expectations of increases of future premiums when
truncating the claims. Prendergast (1992) concludes that bonus-malus systems18 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED CORRELATION BETWEEN THE RISK VARIABLES IN 2007 AND 2008.
Policyholder Type
All Experience- New Experience-
All Fixed-Price New Fixed-Price Rated Rated
ρ 0.0504    0.0356    0.0448    0.0610   
Number of policyholders 57,063 8,774 24,139 2,421
Note:     indicatessignificanceat1%level.Estimatedcorrelationbetweentheriskvariablesinconsecutiveyears,
Y i,2007 and Y i,2008, for fixed-price and experience-rated policyholders.
(as when experience-rating is used) and a lack of information pooling between
insurers (as in the Danish insurance market) constitute an implicit deductible.
They can provide incentives for both self-protection and self-insurance; see
Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
4.3. Moral hazard tests
A positive coverage–risk correlation is a central prediction not only of adverse-
selection models but also of moral hazard models. Therefore, we do a test to see
if there is evidence of moral hazard in our data.
The theory ofmoral hazard predicts that a claim is followedby fewerclaims;
see Abbring et al. (2003b). Consequently, we should see a negative correlation
between the claims in consecutive years. We estimate the correlation between
the risk random variables Y i,2007 and Y i,2008 in the conditional bivariate probit
modelgiveninSection4.1.Theestimationisdoneonpolicyholderswhoheldan
active insurance policy in both 2007 and 2008, and who have no missing values
in the covariates.
The results in Table 6 show that we do not find evidence of moral hazard for
any group of policyholders. Instead we find a positive claims occurrence corre-
lationbetween2007and2008,whichlendssupporttoapplyingexperience-rated
pricing. It indicates that policyholders are unable to change their risk behaviour
sufficiently,atleastnotfromoneyeartothenext;poordriversremainso,atleast
for a while.
However,thismayalsobeaspuriousdependencythatweobserve,duetoun-
observed heterogeneity due to using too few covariates. Abbring et al. (2003a)
propose how to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobserv-
able factors. However, as the focus of our paper is on the robustness of the tests
for asymmetric information, we do not investigate this further.
4.4. Policyholder learning tests
To investigate learning, we estimate the correlation between the claims made in
the year 2007 and the decrease in coverage between 2007 and 2008. Recall thatASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 19
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED CORRELATION BETWEEN THE 2007 RISK VARIABLE AND CHANGE IN COVERAGE FROM 2007 TO
2008.
Policyholder Type
All Experience- New Experience-
All Fixed-Price New Fixed-Price Rated Rated
Decrease in coverage ρ −0.00431 −0.0157 0.0249    0.03617
Increase in coverage ρ 0.00277 0.0149 −0.00567 0.0163
Note:     indicates significance at 1% level. Estimated correlation between the risk variable Y i,2007 in 2007 and
the change in the level of deductible from 2007 to 2008, for fixed-price and experience-rated policyholders. The
estimation is done using the bivariate probit for Y i,2007 and either the zero-one indicator variable 1{di,2008 −
di,2007 > 0} for the decrease in coverage from 2007 to 2008 test, or the zero-one indicator variable 1{di,2008 −
di,2007 < 0} for the increase in coverage test.
dij is the level of deductible chosen by policyholder i in year j, and expressed in
1990 values. Thus if policyholder i decreases their coverage between 2007 and
2008, by choosing a higher level of deductible in 2008, then 1{di,2008 − di,2007 >
0}=1, and otherwise 1{di,2008 − di,2007 > 0}=0. The correlation between
Y i,2007 and 1{di,2008 −di,2007 > 0} was estimated in the bivariate probit model of
Section 4.1.
We also estimated the correlation between the claims made in the year 2007
and the increase in coverage between 2007 and 2008. For the latter, we used the
zero-one indicator function 1{di,2008 − di,2007 < 0}, which takes value one if
policyholder i increased their coverage from 2007 to 2008 (by choosing a lower
level of deductible in 2008), and value zero otherwise. All the results are shown
in Table 7.
When we investigate the decrease in coverage between 2007 and 2008, we
find a significant correlation only for the experience-rated drivers. However,
an experience-rated driver may decrease their coverage after a claim as a way
of reducing the renewal premium to compensate for the post-claim increase in
premium. It also indicates that the policyholder is confident that the claim was
coincidental and that they do not expect any claims in the following insurance
period.
One possible explanation for the lack of significant correlation is that repeat
policyholders and the new fixed-price drivers are already aware of their level of
risk, and have purchased the insurance at a certain level of deductible based on
their risk assessment. The fixed-price drivers take action on the occurrence of
claims and change their deductible, while the experience-rated drivers do not
have to. The new fixed-price drivers might be more inexperienced and are less
able to make a conclusion based on their claims experience, or perhaps they
agree with the increased premium.20 C. DONNELLY, M. ENGLUND AND J.P. NIELSEN
5. CONCLUSIONS
We find evidence of asymmetric information in the Danish data. We do not
find evidence of moral hazard. The way the thresholds, for which the coverage–
risk correlation is statistically significant, separate the policyholders is consis-
tent with the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, which assumes adverse selection with-
out moral hazard. Based on the tests performed, we attribute the cause of the
positive coverage–risk correlation in our investigation to adverse selection.
Our main conclusion is that our results suggest that the tests for asymmetric
information are not robust. Evidence for the existence of asymmetric informa-
tion depends on how coverage was defined, either in monetary terms or relative
to the premium paid, and at what level it was considered to be high. Further
investigation is required to understand the underlying reasons for this. For ex-
ample,itmaybeduetotheparticularformofthepolicyholders’utilityfunction.
On a practical note, it is important for the insurer to monitor the deductible
levels, as the deductible is often seen as a simple and efficient way to avoid small
claimsthatarerelativelyexpensivetoprocess.However,ifthelevelofdeductible
causes adverse selection, this has to be taken into consideration. On the other
hand, the insurer’s profit might be higher for insurance with high coverage, con-
trary to the prediction of competitive markets. This might compensate for the
effects of adverse selection.
We find evidence of policyholder learning, but only for repeat policyholders
with an experienced-rated product, for whom adverse selection is not present.
Consequently, one explanation might be the policyholder maintaining or re-
ducing their total premium after they have experienced a claim. This means
that the experience-rated policyholders are sufficiently aware of their intrinsic
risk and choose the amount of coverage, i.e. level of deductible, based on this.
However, they are not able to change their risk behaviour sufficiently enough to
influence the outcome in a significant way. The experience-rated policyholders
are either unaware of their own risk or they are risk averse. Alternatively, the
pricing scheme of the experience-rated product is sufficiently good to remove
the effects of any possible asymmetric information.
We find a positive claim occurrence dependency, called claims migration,
which indicates that poor drivers remain bad for some time. In other words,
policyholders are generally unable to change their risk behaviour, nor do they
learn from their claims, at least not from one year to the next.
NOTES
1. Cutler (2002) finds evidence of this correlation in a health insurance market. Finkelstein and
Poterba (2004) find this correlation in an annuity market. A recent survey of empirical studies that
test for asymmetric information is Chiappori and Salani´ e (2013).
2. EventhoughChiapporietal.(2006)concludethatapositivecoverage–riskcorrelationwould
be a natural and robust consequence of the assumption of a competitive market.
3. The definition of Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) includes policies with the deductible ex-
pressed as a fixed monetary amount and those with it expressed relative to the premium. However,
they remark that for their data it would make the model too complicated to allow for the differentASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 21
levels of deductible and, in any case, the differences between deductibles are small compared to the
differences between complete and partial coverages. For Cohen (2005); Dionne et al. (2001); Saito
(2006), which relative definition of high coverage is chosen appears to be determined by the menu
of choices offered to the policyholders.
4. For recent work investigating whether drivers’ precautions are influenced by the accident
costs they expect to bear, see Abbring et al. (2003b) and Cohen and Einav (2003).
5. Puelz and Snow (1994) consider an ordered logit formulation for the choice of deductible in
which the observed number of accidents is introduced among the explanatory variables. They esti-
mate two structural equations: the demand function for a deductible and a premium function that
relates different pricing variables to the observed premium. They find a significant correlation be-
tween coverage and occurrence of accidents. However, due to possible non-linear dependencies in
thepricingvariables,theirlinearmodellingprocedureisnotsufficienttotesttheaccident–coverage
correlation that we are interested in; see Dionne et al. (2001) and Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000).
6. Abbring et al. (2003b) and Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) are specific to the French insurance
system, since they make use of the bonus-malus coefficient of the French experience-rating scheme
and the rules for how this can be transferred to the children of policyholders with maximum price
reduction. See also Cohen and Einav (2003) for other possible tests.
7. The general question of which economic theory explains actual insurance decision-making
has not been definitively answered. There does not appear to be compelling experimental evidence
to support one particular theory over another. Kunreuther and Pauly (2005) discuss many of
the features seen in insurance markets that contradict standard economic models of choice and
decision-making. Related papers include Austin and Fischhoff (2010), who study the decision of
whether to purchase collision coverage and, if so, what deductible level to choose, through in-
depth interviews of insured drivers in Pennsylvania. They do not find support for the expected
utility theory prediction that more risk-averse consumers buy more insurance. Similarly, Gneezy
et al. (2006) suggest that there are choice situations in which decision-makers discount lotteries for
uncertainty in a manner that cannot be accommodated by standard models of risky choice, such
as expected utility theory.
8. For a survey in experience rating and credibility theory, see B¨ uhlmann and Gisler (2005).
Frangos and Vrontos (2001) detail an interesting optimal bonus-malus system with a frequency
and severity component, with an extension by Angers et al. (2006). More recent developments
using claim migration are found in Englund et al. (2008) and Englund et al. (2009).
9. Cohen (2005) finds evidence of such asymmetric information for new policyholders with
three or more years of driving experience, which has been unobservable for the insurer. We are not
able to investigate this since the number of years with a driving license is not included in our data
set.
10. The regulations of the French automobile insurance market are described in Chiappori and
Salani´ e (2000) and Richaudeau (1999), and the Canadian ones in Dionne et al. (2001).
11. If we set a dummy variable equal to 1 for female drivers and zero for male drivers, the pa-
rameter estimate of this variable is 0.0994 with a significance level of less than 0.0001.
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